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Foreword 
 
Economic policy-making remains more an art than a science, in common with many 
other areas of public policy.  We know a few things about the technicalities of reform, for 
instance how to streamline customs procedures or simplify the process of business 
registration.  But it is less clear how one gets these and other more complex policies 
agreed upon and implemented. Some believe that we can study the matter and develop 
typologies and recipes, almost a manual. I very much doubt this makes sense. The 
management of societies may not lend itself to engineering-type approaches, where we 
can hope to discover principles of how things work and then design manuals. 
Fundamentally, the process of reform and implementation is about humans agreeing, 
compromising and acting together. In the process, innovation is possible. At the same 
time credibility and some level of predictability matters. The equivalent of immutable 
physical laws remains elusive. For reform we cannot write a blueprint. Like for change 
management in firms, the best we may be able to do is to generate interesting case studies 
that help sharpen judgment and inform policy-makers about the process and impact of 
reforms.  
 
What interest do policy-makers have to sharpen their judgment and learn from other 
experiences? Here, competition matters. Not competition between firms, but between 
jurisdictions. When some countries pull ahead, when they see incomes rise - that makes 
policy-makers in other places wake up. Statistics that allow us to compare the 
performance of different jurisdictions make success and failure visible. GDP statistics 
show us who earns more, who grows. The benchmarking of "competitiveness" gets 
policy-makers’ juices flowing, often under pressure from the media who highlight 
deficiencies revealed by statistics. Just consider the impact of the OECD PISA study on 
comparative performance of education systems or the World Bank/IFC reports on "Doing 
Business".      
 
It is in that perspective that we have embarked on a review of reform episodes. Our hope 
is that the experiences and lessons of the cases analyzed in this paper will indeed help 
sharpen judgment. Additional work is being done on reform episodes monitored by our 
"Doing Business" project. Between our work and that of others there will be close to one 
hundred cases written up. The challenge is to find useful ways of sharing experiences 
among relevant policy-makers and to develop the best possible ways of learning - maybe 
in the spirit of business school case study teaching and, just maybe, in the more distant 
future by using emerging multi-player games to explore governance and policy problems.    




Vice-President, Private Sector Development, World Bank-IFC 









Recent analytical work has led to a broad understanding among policymakers and 
development practitioners that microeconomic reforms aimed at strengthening property 
rights, unleashing competition, and reducing the cost of doing business are critical in 
creating a sound investment climate and achieving growth and poverty reduction (World 
Bank 2004b, 2005a; Lewis 2004). Also recognized is that these changes need to be 
credible and sustained for private firms to respond by increasing investment and 
production.  
 
Much less understood is how to manage such reforms. Investment climate reforms are 
challenging for three main reasons. First, the list of possible reforms is long, and figuring 
out the right priorities and sequencing can be a daunting task. Second, such reforms are 
often politically contentious because of their distributional consequences: groups that lose 
in the short term are often well organized and in a position to resist, while those that 
benefit usually do so only in the long run and are too dispersed to matter politically. And 
third, investment climate reforms can be institutionally challenging: their implementation 
typically requires coordination among diverse departments and levels of government as 
well as fundamental institutional changes in organization, incentives, and behavior that 
can be difficult to achieve. 
  
So, in tackling the investment climate would-be reformers face many technical, political, 
and institutional challenges. Key among these challenges: How to identify the most 
important constraints, and how to sequence reforms? How to overcome opposition from 
interest groups and get reform onto the agenda? How to package reforms so that they are 
both credible and feasible? How to mobilize support for reform? How to create the 
incentives and capacity to implement reform? And how to create institutional 
mechanisms to drive, monitor and sustain reform?  
 
This paper addresses these questions through an analysis of the literature and the findings 
of more than 25 case studies of reform commissioned by the World Development Report 
2005 team and by the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) of the World Bank 
Group (see annex A).
1 The case studies, drawn mostly from developing countries, cover 
the main broad areas of the investment climate: product markets,
2 land markets, labor 
markets, and capital markets. They focus on countries that adopted and implemented a 
                                                 
1 The World Development Report cases can be found on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr/.  
2  Product market reforms include reform of the policies and institutions governing the way in which 
products and services are produced and sold. They tend to be industry specific. The main such regulations 
are those governing: entry (general business registration, industry-specific licensing, and restrictions on 
foreign direct investment); the import and export of goods (quotas, tariffs, and customs); and production 
(price regulations, product standards and government certification processes, intellectual property rights, 
investment incentives, subsidies, and competition policy or agency).  2 
particular investment climate reform with positive results, though many also include 
negative episodes from which lessons can be learned.
3  
 
Though reform is a non-linear, dynamic process, for analytical purposes we distinguish 
between two main stages of reform, each with its own set of challenges and processes: 
 
  Initiating and designing reform—which involves identifying priorities for reform, 
getting reform onto the agenda, developing reform proposals, and building 
acceptance for reform; and   
 
  Implementing and sustaining reform—which involves strengthening the 
incentives and capacity to implement reform and creating institutional 
mechanisms to monitor and sustain reform.   
 
We also distinguish between two sets of factors that influence reform processes: 
contextual factors and those that are within the control of policymakers. A country’s 
political system and culture affect what reformers can achieve.
4 Together they explain a 
large part of the variation in the outcomes of reform and in its impact on economic 
performance. But while reformers must take political institutions and the structure of 
domestic interest groups as given, within this framework--and short of fundamental 
political reform--they have much scope to design and manage the reform process in ways 
that get the process going and achieve favorable outcomes. We focus on those factors 
within the direct control of policymakers, with the goal of highlighting the menu of 
strategic choices at each stage of the reform process. 
 
WHY INVESTMENT CLIMATE REFORMS ARE CHALLENGING 
 
Macroeconomic reforms are often carried out in times of crisis by a stroke of the pen—
achieved by administrative decree and a few key actors. The benefits are usually 
immediate, visible, and spread across the population, with losers or potential losers often 
too dispersed or too small in number to be of political importance.
5  
 
Investment climate reforms are a different matter—and face very different challenges:  
 
  Getting the priorities and sequencing right can be technically challenging. 
Identifying the right package and sequence of reforms can be a difficult task when 
reformers face a long list of constraints and possible reforms. The list of possible 
reforms is indeed long: it is now known that developing countries have to 
improve the way they regulate capital, labor, land, and product markets; reform 
                                                 
3 Detailed discussion of the reforms and their impacts can be found in the case study reports, cited 
throughout the paper. Summaries of selected cases are presented in Annexes C through H.  
4 The role of political systems in development is an important and much broader topic that is not covered in 
any great detail in the paper. Fukuyama (2006) discusses in greater detail how the different types of 
political institutions and political culture shape the ability to generate reform decisions and enforce 
outcomes.  
5 See Krueger (2000) and Navia and Velasco (2002) for more detailed analysis and comparisons of policy 
reform in macro vs. microeconomic areas. This section draws from their work.  3 
their tax and judiciary systems; protect investor and property rights; invest in 
infrastructure and education; and tackle administrative barriers and deeply rooted 
governance issues. The challenge is to identify the reforms that will stimulate a 
quick, strong supply response while laying the groundwork for the next round of 
essential reforms. 
 
  The reforms are often politically contentious. They involve significant transfers of 
income and opportunity. Moreover, those who lose in the short term tend to be 
powerful interest groups or politicians capable of blocking reform, while those 
who gain tend to do so only in the long term and are often too dispersed to matter. 
Thus while removing barriers to entry, for example, favors new entrants, it may 
be resisted by incumbents, feeling threatened by the prospect of competition and 
changes in traditional ways of doing business. The involvement of many players 
and political institutions also mean much slower and less predictable decision-
making processes.  
 
  The reforms can be institutionally challenging. Their implementation can be 
demanding, requiring detailed technical and administrative work and the 
development of institutional mechanisms for sustaining reforms that tend to be 
ongoing rather than one-shot events.  
 
So, in tackling the investment climate would-be reformers face many technical, political, 
and institutional challenges. Key among these challenges:  
 
  How to identify and sequence the most important reforms?  
 
  How to overcome opposition from interest groups and get reform onto the policy 
agenda?  
 
  How to achieve reforms that are both credible and feasible?  
 
  How to mobilize support for reform and mitigate opposition?  
 
  How to create the incentives and capacity for implementation?  
 
  How to create institutional mechanisms to monitor and sustain reform?  
 
 
DIFFERENT REFORMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS, DIFFERENT CHALLENGES 
 
Identifying priorities for reform is a first challenge and a process that is highly country 
specific (as we discuss in greater detail in the following section). But once priorities are 
determined, the reform process tends to confront common political and institutional 
challenges. Not all reforms of the investment climate face these challenges to an equal 
extent, however. Indeed, there is much variation across different reforms (figure 1) as 
well as across different country conditions. 4 
 
 
Figure 1. Different reforms, different levels  
of political and institutional challenge 
 
 
•  Business registration 
reform 
•  Inspections reform 
 
 
•  Land reform 
•  Infrastructure reform 
















The political science literature uses a number of analytical approaches in studying 
political impediments to reform. Chief among them are: collective action by organized 
interest groups; the institutional setting in which policy decisions are made; and political 




Interest groups include political parties and representatives and institutions of the state 
bureaucracy at the central, state, and local levels. Depending on the area of reform, they 
also include a range of external actors—private firms, business associations, labor unions, 
consumer groups, judges, notaries.  
 
Policy preferences and the importance attached to reform vary significantly among these 
groups, depending on the distribution of the costs and benefits of the reform. Their 
relative power—the extent to which they are organized and have access to the political 
process—also varies. Groups likely to lose in the short term, even if small in number, 
tend to resist reform. They also tend to have greater influence in the process, through 
“insider” connections or formal ties to decision-makers and political parties, than do the 
beneficiaries—new entrants and other larger and more diffused groups for whom the 




























 Low 5 
losers, uncertainty about the consequences of reform can generate suspicion and hostility 
or weaken the incentives for potential beneficiaries to organize.  
 
Some investment climate reforms face greater challenges from interest groups than 
others. Reforms that are more technical or administrative, such as business registration or 
inspections reform, tend to affect few clearly identifiable groups capable of mobilizing 
against reform and so may be politically less contentious. The main resistance comes 
from departments and bureaucrats at different levels of government seeking to preserve 
their roles. Reforms with wider distributional consequences are more likely to provoke a 
response from interest groups. These groups can have a positive impact when they 
mobilize support and help get reform onto the agenda. But more often they act to block 
reform, seeking to preserve existing benefits. That makes it difficult to obtain support for 
reform from politicians who benefit from ties to these groups and who are often 
preoccupied with short-term costs and electoral horizons rather than long-term benefits. 
Two examples illustrate:  
 
  Labor market reforms often meet resistance from “insiders” such as unions and 
formal sector workers, who benefit from existing laws and tend to be well 
organized, compared to new entrants or informal workers who benefit from 
reform and lack voice. Moreover, labor market reforms may be opaque to 
ordinary people: voters may not understand or care about their impact and are 
difficult to mobilize in support of reform. These factors help explain why in Latin 
America during the 1990s unions and their parliamentary allies repeatedly stalled 
legislation to extend the use of fixed-term contracts or to reduce severance 
payments. While 24 countries in the region liberalized trade and the financial 
sector, only 6 substantially amended labor laws (Gill, Montenegro, and Domeland 
2002, p. 5). 
 
  Land reform is similarly contentious. Most large-scale redistributions of land have 
taken place only under exceptional circumstances: either under pressure of revolt 
and revolution or in the aftermath of war and foreign occupation. Even where de 
facto property rights are recognized, formalizing land titles and creating land 
registries can run into resistance from interest groups. Notaries and other registry 
personnel may oppose modernization for fear of losing their jobs or opportunities 
for bribery. In Peru local public officials resisted land titling reform because they 
saw it as encroaching on their jurisdiction over urban planning (Endo 2004, p. 
19). 
 
Institutional setting for decision-making 
 
A second political challenge is the institutional setting in which policy decisions are 
made. Reforms which entail fundamental institutional change often require legislation to 
signal government commitment and limit the scope for deviations or reversals in 
implementation. And securing legislative approval often requires the involvement of a 
wide range of political institutions and “veto players”—typically the executive (president 
or prime minister), political parties, the legislature, and the judiciary. (Interest groups 6 
may have special ties to veto players enabling them to influence these players, but they 
do not normally exercise veto power directly.) The political science literature suggests 
that the more veto players there are in a political system, the more credible and stable are 
its policies—but also the more difficult and time-consuming it is to initiate and pass 
reform. 
 
One common finding: initiating reform appears to be easier in presidential than in 
parliamentary systems, but securing approval can be time-consuming. The reason is that 
presidential systems typically grant the president formal agenda-setting powers, including 
the right to initiate reform by executive decree. Presidential authority seems to have been 
important in initiating regulatory reforms in such countries as the Republic of Korea and 
Mexico.
6 But presidential systems may also be less effective at generating decisions 
because they have another veto point: unlike in parliamentary systems, the executive and 
the legislature are independently elected and may be of different political parties. 
Tensions between the executive and the legislature help explain why, for example, many 
Latin American countries with presidential systems found it difficult to agree on labor 
market reforms during the 1990s. In Colombia, labor reform that first appeared on the 
agenda in 1999 took nearly four years, several working drafts, and two failed attempts to 
achieve legislative approval in 2002 (we discuss this example in greater detail in Section 
II below).  
 
Political competition and incentives 
 
A third strand of analysis focuses on the dynamics of political competition and the extent 
to which it provides incentives for politicians to reform.
7 In democratic countries 
elections allow voters to express their political opinions and hold politicians accountable 
for results. But their role may be undermined by political market imperfections. One such 
imperfection is the lack of information, which makes it difficult for voters to judge the 
performance of individual politicians. Even in developed countries politicians can evade 
electoral punishment through obfuscation, particularly when they control media outlets, 
or by spending public money on highly visible but socially worthless projects, or by 
targeting narrow voter groups at the expense of the majority. These problems are 
compounded in developing countries where literacy and press freedoms are generally 
lower. They are also more pronounced in countries with greater social polarization—
where voters may value politicians’ ethnic identity or other attributes over their 
performance and where politicians make promises to these groups at the expense of wider 
benefits—and in countries where patronage and clientelistic politics predominate. The 
lack of competition between political parties and the short time horizon of politicians can 
be further disincentives to deal with reforms with long-term benefits and payoffs. 
 
                                                 
6 As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2002, p. 87) puts it, “More so 
than most parliamentary systems, presidential systems have the capacity for cross-cutting, top-down policy 
reforms.”  
7 This discussion is drawn from Keefer and Khemani (2005) who examine the role of political competition 
in understanding political incentives for providing public services.  7 
These shortcomings help explain why many investment climate reforms are not passed 
even when they might benefit a majority of citizens and voters. They also help explain 
the persistence of corruption and other forms of narrow self-interest among elected 
officials. If politicians know that there is little chance of being held accountable, they 
have little incentive not to be corrupt. But politicians may be less likely to take the risk if 
voters are kept informed about the process through which political decisions are made—
through decentralization, independent validation and communication of the results of 




Investment climate reforms, often ongoing rather than one-shot events, demand technical 
and institutional capacity to plan, implement, and sustain change. Moreover, their 
implementation often involves many different departments and levels of government. 
Inefficient and often corrupt bureaucracies are normally responsible for implementation. 
And monitoring mechanisms that ensure accountability are often lacking. Overcoming 
these challenges requires making fundamental and difficult organizational change or 
creating new institutions with appropriate incentives and capabilities to implement and 
sustain reform.  
 
These challenges are especially prominent in reforms that are ongoing or cross-cutting—
such as regulatory reform aimed at assessing the stock and flow of business regulations or 
inspections reform cutting across a wide range of inspectorates. Other reforms, such as 
labor market reform, face a different type of problem: while less institutionally 
demanding, they often suffer from delays in implementation or lack of policy 
enforcement.  
 
* * * * * 
 
Technical, political, and institutional challenges can pose important obstacles to 
investment climate reforms. Yet reformers have great scope to design and manage the 
reform process in ways that overcome these challenges and make reform possible. As we 
show in the subsequent sections, deliberate choices and strategies arise at each stage of 
the process. A better understanding of these choices can help would-be reformers and 
development practitioners deal with the challenges and improve the prospects for change. 8 
II.   INITIATING AND DESIGNING REFORM 
Identifying priorities for reform and countering resistance from interest groups, 
politicians, and political parties are often the biggest challenges in the early stages of the 
reform process. Our case studies suggest that reformers can deal with these challenges 
by: relying more on new diagnostic tools and practices to identify priorities for reform; 
seizing windows of opportunity to get reform onto the policy agenda; sequencing and 
packaging reforms so that they are both credible and feasible; and using various measures 
to build coalitions for supporting reform.  
 
IDENTIFYING PRIORITIES FOR REFORM 
 
Investment climate reforms cover a wide agenda, and no country can tackle everything at 
once. Establishing priorities is especially important for less developed countries, which 
tend to face all the possible problems but have the least capacity to tackle them. In the 
past, choices were based on a standard list of reforms known as the “Washington 
Consensus” (macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, trade liberalization, protection 
of property rights). But this approach has not always triggered an adequate supply 
response. Reformers often tried to do too much at once, and often failed, or started with 
reforms that were not of high priority; and, sometimes, reform in one area created 
unexpected distortions in another, often leading to weak or even adverse effects 
(Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco 2006, p. 12).  
 
Over the past few years, however, the process of identifying priorities for reform has 
become much more context-specific, and increasingly more targeted. Reformers can 
make use of a growing body of new analytical tools and information to identify priorities 
with greater precision, and in a way that helps deliver results and build momentum for 
more reform. These tools include: 
 
  Surveys of investors that help identify some of the most important issues; 
 
  Detailed benchmarking data, such as those provided by the World Bank Group’s 
Doing Business indicators, which benchmark and rank the cost and quality of 
business regulations for key cross-cutting investment climate issues; 
 
  Market information on prices and return on investments which provide important 
information. For example, high real interest rates indicate that access to finance is 
a key constraint, while low returns to education suggest that aggregate skills are 
not, at least for now (Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco 2005); and 
 
  In-depth industry analyses which can be used to identify industry-specific policy 
issues, such as entry barriers, undue protection and subsidies, inadequate price 
and product regulations, and issues relating to government certification and 
protection of intellectual property rights (Palmade 2005). 
 9 
 
Complementarity between reforms and the role of policy learning a l s o  n e e d  t o  b e  
considered. Reforms in one area, such as trade and product markets, may amplify the 
benefits of reforms in other areas, such as the labor market. Moreover, labor market 
reforms may allow for the compensation of losers from trade and product market 
reforms.
8 Synergies in economic impact (for example, reforming land markets and 
contract enforcement also improves access to financing) and in political economy 
(combining trade reforms with social protection can diffuse opposition) also come into 
play. And reform priorities often emerge through a process of policy learning and 
experimentation. China is a striking example of a country that designed and sequenced 
reforms by learning from its own policy experiments and, to some extent, from the 
experiences of other economies as well (see page 18 below). 
 
SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES TO GET REFORM ONTO THE POLICY AGENDA 
 
Once the priorities for reform are determined, what makes reform possible? One popular 
view is that reform is possible only in times of crisis or under a new government, when 
reformers benefit from strong political and popular support that makes it easier to counter 
opposition from interest groups. Indeed, our cases suggest that policymakers more often 
than not use these events to sharpen the focus on a problem and bring it onto the policy 
agenda. But crisis and political change are not the only factors that make reform possible.  
 
Reformers often take advantage of periods of growth to make hard choices, because 
public support is high and resources are available to compensate losers. Two other factors 
also appear to play an important role (figure 2): 
 
  Increasing competition, created by global integration and technological changes 
more broadly, and by spillovers from other policy initiatives such as trade 
liberalization or international agreements; and 
 
  New information and diagnostics that expose a policy problem and create 
awareness of the need for reform, as well as new policy ideas generated from past 
experiences and an ongoing process of learning and diffusion. 
 
Our analysis also suggests that identifying a single cause of reform can be difficult: only 
a few of our cases highlight just one factor as being important (see annex B). More often 
it is a combination of factors—and players—that helped create a window of opportunity 
to get reform onto the agenda. Indeed, in all our cases, political leaders played a critical 
role in recognizing a problem and seizing the brief windows of opportunity to get reforms 
onto the agenda. Moving quickly was seen to be important, given that windows for 
reform remain open only for brief periods before policymakers feel they have addressed 
the problem, before events or personnel change, or before interest groups coalesce against 
                                                 
8 An analysis and more detailed discussion of reform complementarities, drawing from reform experiences 
in OECD countries over a five-year period, can be found in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, April 
2004 (IMF 2004).  10 
reform (see Kingdon 1995 for a detailed discussion of policy windows in the agenda 
setting phase of reform).   
 





Using political change and crisis as catalysts 
 
Political change and crisis are often considered important catalysts for reform. New 
governments or new political leaders benefit from a “honeymoon” period in which 
opposition parties and interest groups are less likely to oppose reform and reformers have 
enough time before new elections to win back the support of groups that might be 
alienated by reforms. And crisis is seen to help focus attention on policies that are not 
working, induce legislators and citizens to grant executives greater discretionary 
authority, and weaken the influence of interest groups opposed to reform (Haggard 2000; 
Tommasi 2002).  
 
Indeed, political change played a big part in catalyzing reform in half of our cases. Newly 
elected governments, especially those that gained political control, used their first year in 
office to launch or pass difficult and unpopular reforms. In Colombia labor market 
reforms came onto the agenda in 1999, but it took a new government to get the reforms 
passed in 2002 amidst a severe unemployment crisis.  In office for less than a year, the 
new government had strong popular support and faced little threat of political defeat. The 
appointment of a new minister of labor who championed the reforms proved critical. 
Rapid approval of the new labor code was also aided by the fact that many of the policy 
proposals had been prepared and widely discussed during two previous attempts in 1999 
and 2001 (Echeverry and Santa Maria 2004, p. 30). New governments in Poland and the 
Slovak Republic also passed difficult labor market reforms well within the first year of 
taking office, building on preparatory work that had already been done.  
 
In non-democratic settings reform came about as a result of new political leadership 
rather than electoral change. In Vietnam pressure from the domestic private sector for 
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legalized in 1990. But the turning point came with changes in the country’s one-party 
leadership in 1997. The appointment of a new prime minister, president, and party 
secretary general led to early public announcement of an action plan to improve the 
business environment and the subsequent passage of a new Enterprise Law in 1999 
(Mallon 2004, p. 15). A similar change in political leadership in China in 1978 initiated 
the country’s vast and sustained program of pro-market microeconomic reforms, 
including the decision to pilot major land market reforms in Shenzhen in the mid-1980s. 
 
Often coinciding with political change, crisis played a big part in 40 percent of our cases. 
Fiscal and financial crises were most often the catalyst, leading policymakers to bundle 
investment climate reforms with a larger package of macroeconomic and structural 
reforms aimed at addressing the crisis. In the Slovak Republic the 1998 fiscal crisis 
created the political support the new government needed to pass a comprehensive reform 
package that included a range of controversial labor, social welfare, and tax reforms 
(Jurajda and Mathernova 2004, p. 8). The government also benefited from a relatively 
homogeneous coalition of four center-right parties and from the relative 
underdevelopment of trade unions and other groups opposed to reforms. In Korea the 
1997 Asian financial crisis enabled the government to move away from a piecemeal 
approach and adopt a radical deregulation initiative as part of a broader economic 
recovery program; the reforms called for eliminating 50 percent of business regulations 
and deepening regulatory reforms that had so far yielded little result (FIAS 2005f, p. 6).  
 
But it was not always a fiscal or financial crisis that provided the impetus. Other types of 
crisis also helped propel reform onto the agenda: unprecedented levels of unemployment 
in the case of labor market reforms in Colombia and Poland; big corruption scandals in 
the case of regulatory reforms in Korea and Italy; and two major safety accidents in the 
case of inspections reform in the Netherlands. 
 
Taking advantage of spillovers from trade and product market reforms 
 
Growing competition from global integration and rapid technological change is a broad 
force driving change. But investment climate reforms are also pushed onto the agenda as 
a result of spillovers from more specific policy initiatives. Trade and product market 
reforms proved to be a major driver of other reforms in virtually all our case studies. By 
increasing competition, such reforms helped shift the incentives of incumbents once 
opposed to reform while creating new constituencies for change. In Mexico trade 
liberalization through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) induced 
business associations to lobby the government for reductions in the regulatory burden to 
help them compete (Salas 2004, p. 6). And in Colombia greater openness and competition 
led employers to become vocal supporters of reforms aimed at increasing labor market 
flexibility (Echeverry and Santa Maria 2004, p. 13). That an economy’s openness is 
significantly associated with institutional change is among the main findings of the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook, September 2005 (box 1). Conversely, the regions that have 
done the least on the investment climate front (such as South Asia and the Middle East 
and North Africa) also tend to be those with the highest barriers to trade and foreign 
direct investment. 12 
 
Reformers also took advantage of international agreements to build popular support for a 
broader goal and create the climate for change. Such agreements were a major catalyst 
for reform in more than a third of our cases. Integration with the European Union (EU), 
which provides tangible political and economic benefits for member countries, was the 
main impetus in all the cases in Central and Eastern Europe.
9 In Latvia political 
consensus in favor of joining the EU combined with a push from a strong, well-organized 
private sector made it easier for the government to adopt regulatory and inspections 
reform as part of the broader EU harmonization program (Coolidge, Grava, and Putnina 
2004, p. 9). To a lesser extent such countries as China and Vietnam leveraged the 
prospect of joining the World Trade Organization to deepen market reforms aimed at 



























                                                 
9 The IMF, in its World Economic Outlook, September 2005 (IMF 2005), notes that external agreements or 
anchors are more effective in supporting reform when they provide tangible benefits and a credible 
commitment device, such as the EU, which provides clear political benefits as well as market access, 
increased foreign direct investment, and a well-defined set of legislation and reforms. Regional trade 
groups such as NAFTA or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also important but 
have had more limited success because their requirements are less stringent. While such anchors are not 
present in other regions, some initiatives offer promising potential for creating anchors in the future, such 
as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) through its peer review mechanism in Sub-
Saharan Africa (see IMF 2005, p. 146).  13 
 
Box 1. What drives institutional change? 
 
The International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook, September 2005 (IMF 2005) 
investigates the main factors driving such institutional transitions as strengthening property rights, 
lowering corruption, and improving accountability. An econometric analysis based on transitions 
in some 65 countries uses a probit model linking the probability of transition to several possible 
explanatory factors. The findings suggest that while a country’s institutions are shaped by a 
combination of history, economic structure, political system, and culture, they are not immutable. 
A range of factors can help bring about institutional change: 
 
  Trade openness is significantly associated with a greater likelihood of institutional 
transitions and with greater institutional quality. A move from complete autarky to full 
liberalization increases the probability of transition by about 15 percentage points. 
Greater openness allows a greater role for export sectors that are rent-proof and require 
innovation, creating momentum for positive institutional changes. It also reduces the 
ability of domestic producers to sustain monopolistic rents, which impede 
improvements. 
  Transitions are also more likely in countries with high levels of press freedom, a broad 
indicator of political accountability. With the political leadership answerable to a broad 
cross-section of the population, policies are more likely to be beneficial to the broader 
economy. Greater accountability is also associated with higher institutional quality. 
  Improvements are more likely in countries whose neighbors have higher institutional 
quality. This is consistent with the view that a strong regional effect exists: transitions 
are more likely to happen in clusters of countries within a region around the same time, 
reflecting competition and the demonstration effects of regional success stories. 
  By contrast aid appears to have a negative impact on the probability of transition. This 
may reflect the fact that countries that receive more aid are also those that suffer from 
disadvantageous initial conditions that impede change. The empirical evidence on the net 
effect of aid on institutions is mixed. 
 
Source: IMF 2005, chapter 3. 
 
 
Generating new information to create demand for change  
 
New information about a specific policy problem provides another impetus in creating 
demand for policy change. In Colombia the 2002 labor market reforms originated in a 
1999 study led by a small group of technocrats in the Ministry of Labor supported by 
private think tanks and academia. By benchmarking regulatory performance against that 
of neighbors and OECD countries for the first time, the study helped spark a national 
debate and laid the groundwork for the passage of the new labor law in 2002 (Echeverry 
and Santa Maria 2004, p. 12). In Vietnam detailed diagnostic studies by the Central 
Institute for Economic Management, a government think tank, exposed the costs of doing 
business (including corruption) under the old Company Law. These analyses, providing 
the first measures of the potential growth and employment gains from reform, were used 
to counter opposition to the new Enterprise Law from vested interest groups (Mallon 
2004, p. 30). In all the cases of land market reform new information about the costs and 14 
benefits of improving access to land among other issues helped focus attention on the 
problem and build broad consensus for change among a wide group of stakeholders. 
 
International benchmarking indicators and cross-country comparisons are important in 
identifying priority areas for reform, but they are also valuable tools for fostering 
competition and promoting reform. The country rankings recently published by the 
World Bank Group’s Doing Business project (World Bank 2005a) triggered calls for 
change in more than 20 countries. Sub-national benchmarking can help foster reform by 
creating competition between jurisdictions, as it is doing in India and Mexico. In these 
and other cases diffusion of ideas between national and sub-national levels has also 
helped jump-start the reform process. In Mexico federal regulatory reforms helped 
promote fast-track business start-up programs in several states and more than 20 cities 
(Salas and Kikeri 2005), while in China policy experimentation with land reforms in 
Shenzhen municipality led to changes at the national level (discussed in greater detail on 
page 18).   
 
Reform often comes about through the accumulation of “intellectual innovations”—or 
new policy ideas—and through a dynamic process of policy learning and diffusion of 
best practices among specialists or by international and other organizations (Orenstein 
2000, Stern et al 2005). Regulatory reforms at the federal level in Mexico were prompted 
in part by the example of the United States and by advice on best practices from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In other cases the 
direct exchange of experience helped convince policymakers of the need for reform. 
Pakistani reformers learned about capital market reforms through visits to Australia and 
Malaysia, and mainland Chinese officials garnered ideas about land reform on frequent 
visits to Hong Kong (China).  
 
The spread of new information has been aided by the information revolution of the past 
decade. The rapid proliferation of the Internet, mobile communications, and other 
technologies allows reformers and citizens in developing countries to learn what has been 
tried elsewhere, what has worked, and what has not. Especially in countries with a free 
press, these new sources of information have helped put pressure on governments to 
reform; indeed, some analysts have argued that the explosion of information was largely 
responsible for the spread of market-oriented reforms in Eastern Europe (Kedzie 1997). 
 
Leading the way through political leadership 
 
Getting reforms onto the agenda appears to be a largely top-down process: the policy 
reform literature suggests that political leaders (heads of government and their political 
appointees) play a key role in seizing opportunities and promoting reform, drawing on 
their institutional and organizational powers and their ability to command public attention 
(Kingdon 1995). But technocrats and policy entrepreneurs, both in the government and 
outside (think tanks, NGOs, academia), also perform a crucial role in this process, 
helping to shape and continuously push for reform.  
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The case studies underscored the importance of political leadership in seizing reform 
opportunities and getting the process started. In Mexico a powerful president who 
controlled the party in power was instrumental in launching regulatory reforms in the late 
1980s that had been designed and promoted by a small group of technocrats in the 
Ministry of Economy and Trade. And in Peru presidential support was crucial to getting 
the second round of land market reforms onto the agenda in the early 1990s, aided by the 
persistent diagnostic and advocacy efforts of the Institute of Democracy and Liberty. Just 
as persuasive are the many converse examples from those countries where, despite no 
shortage of high-quality analysis and proposals, reforms failed to get onto the agenda 
because of a lack of political leadership.  
 
Donor role   
 
Donor pressure to initiate reforms was not an important factor in our cases, though it is 
often perceived as one in developing countries. Instead, reform was largely a domestic 
process driven by local champions. Part of the reason may be that many of the reforms 
we reviewed took place in the 1990s, when donors focused more on macroeconomic and 
structural reforms than on microeconomic ones. Investment climate reforms are still 
relatively new to the agenda, and donors, like policymakers, are on the learning curve.  
 
Where donors were involved, in such countries as Hungary, Latvia, Pakistan, and the 
Slovak Republic, they focused largely on providing diagnostic support rather than (as in 
earlier reforms relating to macroeconomic or privatization policy) on imposing 
conditionality, given the different political and institutional challenges and timeframes of 
such reforms. Even so, the presence of donors in these cases was seen as strengthening 
the hand of reformers against their opponents.  
 
 
STARTING WITH REFORMS THAT ARE BOTH CREDIBLE AND FEASIBLE  
 
The accumulation and diffusion of knowledge and perspectives among policy specialists 
will generate a range of policy options in any area of reform. Which of these options 
should be considered? Should reformers start with radical options that may have bigger 
payoffs, or incremental steps that may provide smaller payoffs but are easier to 
implement? Can pilot and sector-specific programs help iron out technical difficulties and 
build support through demonstration effects?  
 
Different circumstances may call for different strategies and tactics. Reformers with 
strong political support (as a result of crisis, a new government, new leadership) may find 
it easier to “strike while the iron is hot,” embracing faster and bolder reform. But 
reformers contending with divided politics, strong interest group resistance, and weak 
capacity may face constraints on the extent of change. In these cases policy learning 
through pilots and other pragmatic measures that target specific constraints, build on 16 
previous experiences, encourage the development of constituencies, and are easy to 
implement can help jump-start the reform process.
10  
 
Our cases suggest there are simply no hard and fast rules. What matters more is to 
achieve policy credibility by recognizing and targeting the main policy constraint, 




Setting the pace of reform—radical or incremental? 
 
Agenda change can often be sudden and radical, aimed at signalling a shift in direction 
and securing political support (Kingdon 1995). But the process of reform tends to be 
more incremental—though crisis or new governments can create opportunities for more 
radical shifts.
12 Financial crises in Hungary and Korea for instance provided reformers 
strong political support to adopt far-reaching regulatory reforms, while the 1998 fiscal 
crisis did the same in the Slovak Republic. Similarly, in Mozambique the resettlement 
crisis made possible the complete revision of the Land Law in 1995, designed to 
eliminate the most important distortions and demonstrate credible government 
commitment to land reform (Tanner 2002, p. 15).  
 
But radical change, while it may be desirable, may not always be feasible, especially in 
systems with many checks and balances, fragile coalition governments, strong interest 
group opposition, or weak implementation capacity. In circumstances such as these, the 
process of reform tends to be more incremental. Reform may start by adopting the easier 
measures first—to demonstrate feasibility, achieve initial successes, and develop the 
constituencies and capacity for deeper changes over time. Vietnam’s enterprise reforms 
in 2000 for instance began by simplifying business start-up procedures. That helped 
expand the private sector and create a constituency for the more difficult licensing 
reforms, which then enabled reformers to offset resistance from line ministries and 
provincial authorities (Mallon 2004, p. 26). Peru’s land market reforms began with the 
politically easier titling measures. These led to quick, tangible gains, helping create 
support and capacity for the more difficult and longer-term program to formalize property 
(Endo 2004, p. 10). And Mexico’s deregulation unit started its ambitious program to 
reduce red tape by reviewing the regulations of simpler, more cooperative line ministries. 
In this way it slowly built experience and credibility to tackle the more complex 
ministries (Salas 2004, p. 16).  
 
Incremental or partial reforms can be risky, however: if they produce no effects or even 
adverse effects, they can undermine the credibility of the entire reform effort. Before 
                                                 
10 For an in depth discussion of the tradeoffs between the various sequencing and packaging approaches, 
see Chapter 10 in  Stern et al 2005, which examines the dynamics of political reform.    
11 Klein and Hadjimichael (2003) discuss in greater length the issue of policy credibility and what it takes 
to achieve it, see in particular their chapter 7 on policy and the country context for reform.  
12 On a slightly different but related note, an analysis of growth accelerations by Rodrik (2004) suggests 
that the vast majority of growth take-offs is not produced by significant or comprehensive radical reforms, 
and that the vast majority of significant reforms do not produce growth take-offs. The paper highlights the 
problems with the “do as much as you can, as quickly as you can” approach (pp. 6-7).  17 
adopting a bold land reform program, Mozambique first took an incremental approach; 
Korea and the Slovak Republic did the same in regulatory reform. In these cases the 
incremental reforms were unsuccessful—and costly to taxpayers. Similarly, piecemeal 
inspections reforms in the Philippines and the Russian Federation were no more than 
short-term palliatives, and they quickly became subject to backtracking and reversals 
(Coolidge forthcoming). 
 
Moreover, short-term winners from partial reform may act to preserve their gains by 
blocking further reform. A study of partial reform in the early stages of post-communist 
transitions shows that financial-industrial conglomerates that gained from privatization 
used their power to block new market entry, while new “entrepreneurs cum mafiosi” 
undermined efforts to establish a viable legal system to support the market economy 
(Hellman 1998). The study suggests that the success of partial reform depends on both 
creating winners and “constraining” them. Winners can be constrained by increasing 
political competition and expanding political participation to include short-term losers 
and a wider range of constituencies in policymaking. In this case post-communist states 
with greater political participation and competition were able to adopt and sustain more 
comprehensive reforms than those largely insulated from mass politics and electoral 
pressures.  
 
Identifying the most important constraints at the beginning of the process is one way to 
minimize these risks and achieve credibility. Another is through the use of targeted, 
pragmatic interventions that seize opportunities for reform but are also politically and 
technically feasible.
13 Pilots and sector-specific approaches are among such interventions.  
 
Using pilots and sector-specific reforms as learning and demonstration tools 
 
When reform faces technical and political challenges, pilot programs can help by 
providing learning and demonstration effects. In China, where pilots have been at the 
center of the reform strategy, states and provinces have often functioned as “laboratories 
of reform,” with policy experiments in one location feeding into the agenda-setting 
process for others (box 2). In Jordan customs reform was first developed and tested in the 
Aqaba special economic zone before being rolled out to the rest of the country. In Peru 
land reforms began with a series of pilot projects in the early 1990s that provided useful 
learning about constraints and effectiveness for the nationwide program (Endo 2004, p. 
14). And in South Africa the property valuation approach using market assessments was 
applied to the entire country in 2004 (with Parliament’s adoption of the National Property 
Tax Act) only after being piloted by Cape Town in 2000 (FIAS 2005h, p. 6).  
 
Identifying and supporting sectors with high growth potential is another way to get 
reform started, as suggested by recent work outside of our case studies. In the Dominican 
Republic, for example, tourism and the maquila sector (the assembly of imported parts 
for re-export) were the main drivers of growth. Like the rest of the economy, they faced 
problems relating to infrastructure, security, and trade protectionism. But rather than 
                                                 
13 The term strategic incrementalism has been used to describe this approach, see World Bank (2005b), pp. 
301–02.  18 
tackle these difficult problems across the economy, the government insulated these two 
sectors and provided targeted solutions, improving security and infrastructure around the 
main tourist areas and giving the maquila  sector special trade policy treatment 
(Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco 2006, p. 15). 
 
Pilots or sector-specific experiments can be important catalysts for nationwide reform 
rather than enclaves, provided they are properly designed. Reformers need to design these 
initiatives from the outset to be replicable elsewhere. They also need to tackle 
institutional and other constraints to the expansion of reforms beyond the pilot areas. And 
they need to keep their attention focused on the pilot throughout the process—from 
design through implementation and monitoring—to learn the lessons offered for broader 
reforms. Most importantly, while pilot and sector-specific approaches help elicit 
information about what works, they also require willingness and clear criteria or 
mechanisms for cutting-off failures before they become too costly.  
 
 
Box 2. Special economic zones as the laboratories for China’s land reforms 
 
In China special economic zones served as the laboratories for developing nationwide land 
reforms in the 1980s. The experiments with land started with the establishment of the Shenzhen 
special economic zone. When foreign firms started to invest in Shenzhen under China’s “open 
door” policy, demand for land grew rapidly. Because the existing legal framework did not allow 
the transfer of land, the local government tested transfers of land use rights by allowing the 
allocation of state-owned land to serve as local firms’ contributions to foreign joint ventures. 
Prompted by continued growth in demand and by learning from Hong Kong (China),  the 
provincial government took the experiment further: in 1981 it issued regulations allowing the 
transfer of land use rights to investors and establishing fee standards for land use. By separating 
land use from land ownership rights, the new policy allowed foreign investors for the first time to 
lease land for a given period, with up-front fees for use rights. It also increased revenues for the 
provincial government and preserved its land ownership.  
 
The experiment continued. In 1987 the provincial government declared the end of the old free 
land use policy and the Shenzhen municipality conducted the first sale of land use rights to a local 
public company. And in 1988 provincial ordinances officially recognized that land use rights 
could be transferred, assigned, or mortgaged. The successful experiment in Shenzhen led to a 
national constitutional amendment allowing transfers of land use rights (leases) “in accordance 
with the law”—the critical step that permitted land market reforms to spread to the rest of the 
country. 
 
Source: FIAS case study of reform in Shenzhen, China, forthcoming. 
 
 
BUILDING COALITIONS TO SUPPORT REFORM 
 
Reform is most likely to succeed in a supportive political climate. Creating such a climate 
can be a central challenge of the reform process. It requires understanding the attitudes 
and influence of different stakeholder groups. It also requires the painstaking process of 
building coalitions for reform. And that requires strategies to leverage and mobilize 19 
supporters, both powerful and not so powerful, while diffusing resistance, especially from 
influential interest groups (figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Strategies for managing different sets of stakeholders 
 
 
A: Stakeholders who support 
reforms but are less influential  
•  Mobilize and empower this group 
of stakeholders through education 
programs and opportunities to 
participate in the reform process 
 
B: Stakeholders who are strong 
supporters and have high influence 
•  Leverage this group of 
stakeholders by using them to 
promote and champion reform 
 
C: Stakeholders who oppose 
reforms but have low influence  
•  Follow strategies similar to those 
for D but with lower priority 
 
D: Stakeholders who oppose reforms 
and are influential  
•  Diffuse and mitigate opposition 
from this group by informing and 
educating the  public,  fostering 
consultative approaches, and 
compensating where appropriate  
  
Low          High 
        Influence 
 
 
Leveraging and empowering supporters 
 
Supporters or potential supporters of reform (A and B in figure 3) are often overlooked or 
taken for granted. But mobilizing them can help increase the strength or density of 
support for reform, which in turn helps weaken the opposition and influence of interest 
groups.  
 
Creating champions of reform 
 
Strong and influential proponents of reform can be easily identified and mobilized to 
become champions for reform. In Mexico the small, empowered group of technocrats 
leading the first deregulation unit (UDE) became a major lobbying force for later 
transforming it into a commission backed by law (Cofemer). UDE and Cofemer in turn 
leveraged the support and influence of major industrial players and other private 
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Other reformers created small, independent teams as the focal point for challenging the 
status quo and promoting reform—usually an inter-ministerial commission, a special task 
force, or a working group reporting to top political leaders and comprising a mix of 
reform-minded technocrats and external experts. In Korea a group of presidential advisers 
chosen from outside the traditional bureaucracy championed the 1998 regulatory reforms 
(FIAS 2005f, p. 16). In Hungary a small, ad hoc task force in the Ministry of Finance 
closely linked to the prime minister’s office led the 1994 regulatory reforms (FIAS 
2005e, p. 24). And in the Slovak Republic a small team of advisers to the deputy prime 
minister for economic affairs—mostly trained overseas nationals lured back by the 
prospect of EU membership—worked to champion reform (Jurajda and Mathernova 
2004, p. 19). 
 
Informing and educating the public 
 
Mobilizing less influential groups and the public at large poses a bigger challenge. Many 
investment climate reforms are opaque or even an object of suspicion to voters. Negative 
public opinion can impede or even prevent reform. But policymakers fear that educating 
the public takes too much time and that publicizing bad economic situations can risk 
making the problems worse. Reformers also are reluctant to undertake public education 
programs because they lack information about the programs’ benefits.  
  
Yet communications and education through the media and other means can help allay 
public fears, persuade citizens that change is in the national interest, and build broad 
public support for reform—with individual politicians and interest groups no longer able 
to resist public pressure for change. Public education is especially important in new or 
controversial reforms that are not widely understood. To reduce opposition to land reform 
from municipalities, Peru’s government mobilized support from informal urban settlers, 
the main beneficiaries, business associations and political parties by sharing information 
about the reform and its objectives and holding public hearings and debates in 
communities (Endo 2004, p. 20). Other reformers built support by linking new reforms to 
broader goals that already enjoyed wide support. Korea, for example, framed regulatory 
reforms as an anticorruption campaign. Vietnam linked enterprise reforms directly to 
employment growth. And in Cape Town, South Africa, reformers tied property tax 
reforms to “common equity objectives,” which secured support for a potentially divisive 
reform on the eve of local elections.  
 
Encouraging public participation 
 
Going further, reformers can empower potential supporters by seeking their active 
participation in the reform process. In Hungary the commissioner for public 
administration, responsible for deregulation, organized conferences and technical 
workshops throughout the country and invited citizens and public employees to submit 
deregulation proposals, promising a monetary prize for the best one (FIAS 2005e, p. 30). 
In Korea reformers solicited inputs on a wide range of regulatory policy initiatives from 
NGOs and broad coalitions such as the Citizens’ Coalition for Better Government (FIAS 
2005f, p. 12). And in Vietnam the government distributed drafts of the Enterprise Law to 21 
mass organizations and the public at large for comments and feedback (Mallon 2004, p. 
36). These efforts helped foster national dialogue and generate public support--and 
provided a valuable citizen feedback loop in the reform process.  
 
Diffusing stakeholder opposition 
 
Diffusing resistance from opponents of reform (C and D in figure 3), particularly 
influential individuals or interest groups (D), is part of the process. Leveraging and 
empowering supporters and potential supporters are critical in this regard, but dialogue 
and compensation also have a part to play.  
 
Establishing a process for dialogue and consultation 
 
In the early stages of reform, public education and persuasion can generate “buy-in” for 
reform. Some reforms may also require narrower and more structured dialogue with the 
private sector and other stakeholder groups on concrete policy alternatives. Consultation 
is particularly important for policies which will have wide distributional consequences 
and are likely to impact multiple stakeholder groups. In such reforms, failing to consult 
can lead to missed opportunities for “discovery” or the vital exchange of information that 
can inform policy-making.
14 It can also create suspicion and defer resistance to a later 
stage, as it did in Korea and Mexico where the failure to build a sufficiently broad base of 
stakeholder support at an early stage hampered implementation of regulatory reforms (for 
more on this, see the section on creating oversight mechanisms). Moreover, dialogue and 
consultation can help make the outcome more credible, even at the expense of delays and 
compromise. And it can provide an incentive for interest groups to participate in positive 
ways while weakening their ability to directly influence government. 
 
Consultation proved to be important in both democratic and non-democratic settings, 
though the extent of it differed from case to case depending on the type of reform and 
initial circumstances. Several rounds of negotiations and compromise among multiple 
players were needed to smooth the way for politically-laden labor market reforms in 
Colombia (box 3) and Poland. Consultation also played an important part in countries 
commonly perceived as having top-down government with limited opportunities for 
political participation. In Vietnam reformers secured approval of the Enterprise Law 
through a formal process of public-private dialogue on various drafts with private sector 
groups and associations. The process also helped create a framework for discussions with 
members of the National Assembly, the legal establishment, and grassroots organizations 
(Mallon 2004). Similarly, in China the government of Hangzhou municipality set up a 
“hearing system” to elicit feedback from external experts, business groups, and the public 
on proposals to change the investment approval system. By doing so, the government 
refined its proposals and built broad support that helped weaken the resistance of line 
agencies (Yufei, Lei, and Yu 2004). 
                                                 
14 Rodrik (2004) argues that industrial policy is like a “discovery process” (p.3) where firms and the 
government through an institutional process of dialogue are able to exchange information about the 
underlying costs and opportunities and engage in strategic coordination.    22 
 
 
Box 3. How consultation helped pave the way for labor market reforms in Colombia 
 
Colombia’s far-reaching labor reforms, passed in 2002, were, from the outset, deeply political 
and generated intense opposition from strong and powerful interest groups. Formal sector 
workers with the most to lose were vocal and active in their opposition through strikes and other 
means. Fierce opposition also emerged from other organized players who derived substantial 
benefits from the status quo: unions of the large public and private agencies that administered 
“parafiscal” taxes and services (a key non-wage labor cost imposed on employers to finance 
social welfare programs for the general population, amounting to 8 percent of payroll), which 
together managed about $750 million per year and employed nearly 25,000 people throughout 
Colombia; unionized blue collar workers who directly benefited from the social services; and 
member of congress, mayors, state governors and other career politicians who used the agencies 
for patronage and other political purposes. These groups also mobilized other more powerful 
groups not directly affected by the reforms but with considerable disrupting power, including the 
teachers’ union, university students, and pensioners. Meanwhile the main beneficiaries of reform, 
the unemployed and informal workers, were too dispersed and too weak to lobby for reform.  
 
Managing the opposition required efforts to slowly build consensus through stakeholder 
discussions. The government established a “discussion table” in 2000 with representatives from 
the most important groups—government, the main labor unions, key business federations, the 
main political parties, and academia. Their wide-ranging views made initial discussions of the 
reform contentious and confrontational. Agreeing on a diagnosis and solution proved challenging. 
To make the case for reform, the reform team presented the underlying economic analysis and 
empirical evidence. But selling the story proved difficult: interest groups rejected the evidence, 
questioned the underlying model, and successfully stigmatized the reforms as leading to 
unemployment and a reduction in income. Despite the difficulties, the continuity and conviction 
of a core group of technocrats proved crucial in keeping the discussions going.  
 
The consultation process not only helped build awareness. It also exposed key players to reform 
ideas, and helped reach compromise on a set of proposals that were politically feasible and 
allowed for quick congressional approval. While many of the original proposals remained in tact, 
bargains were reached on two of the most controversial elements of the reform package. First, the 
payment of parafiscal taxes was made more flexible rather than reduced, as originally proposed 
and defeated in an earlier attempt in 2001. With some restrictions, the law exempted payment of 
such taxes for new blue collar workers for a maximum of four years, and for students under 25 
years of age working part-time. And second, while the 2001 bill contained a provision for 
deepening the “salario integral”, an instrument that allows employers to hire workers under a 
contract that does not oblige them to pay certain non-wage costs, the 2002 package of reforms 
was passed without this provision. While the reform package did not include any direct 
provisions to compensate losers, it included a host of broader social protection measures, 
including the contemplation of an unemployment insurance scheme, the strengthening of public 
pension and health programs, and the creation of a micro-credit program for small enterprises. 
The main lesson from Colombia’s experience: it can take years of slowly “selling” a reform until 
an initiative actually gains momentum and is passed. 
 
Source: Echeverry and Santa Maria 2004. 
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The process of negotiating and bargaining with multiple groups can be difficult and 
confrontational, requiring a delicate balance between achieving political compromise and 
meaningful policies that do not jeopardize the benefits of reform. Our cases showed that 
the process requires support and commitment from the top political leadership. But it also 
requires the support of technocrats, and sometimes external moderators, to focus on the 
policy issues, maintain continuity and political neutrality, and ensure accountability and 
legitimacy of the process. In Vietnam leaders from the Central Institute for Economic 
Management and the Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry—the central 
institutional players in the process—played key roles in engaging with policymakers, 
business, and the media. In Latvia technocratic staff at the Latvian Development Agency 
and Bureau of Public Administration Reform supported and sustained the process 
throughout. And in Peru the involvement of the Institute of Liberty and Democracy was 
perceived as having made the process objective, fair, and transparent.  
 
At the same time consultation may have its limits in difficult reforms facing intense 
opposition from narrow interest groups. In such cases policymakers have often 
confronted opponents, fearing that consultation can be counterproductive because it gives 
too much influence to specific groups, takes too much time and delays reform, or leads to 
minimal reform proposals. For these reasons port reform in Colombia and customs 
reform in Mexico were both largely top-down affairs: rampant corruption and 
inefficiency, broad public support for change, and a brief window of opportunity led 




A few investment climate reforms, such as infrastructure reform, can involve clear groups 
of losers—for example, state enterprise workers with high job security and generous pay 
and benefits. In these cases mitigating opposition may require directly compensating such 
groups. The port reform in Colombia for instance included generous severance packages 
to minimize opposition from workers, while telecommunications reform in Uganda was 
accompanied by a package of guarantees and new pension benefits for workers 
transferring to the privatized entity. Direct compensation programs may raise concern 
that payments are being captured by politically powerful groups, but such concerns can 
be minimized by demonstrating the net benefits from the reform for society as a whole. 
The programs also can entail high up-front costs and can backfire if not carefully 
managed. In Colombia, the severance program helped mitigate opposition but also 
became a problematic part of the reform program, creating favorable conditions for 
corruption and fraud in its administration, which eventually led to the imprisonment of 
corrupt officials (Navarrete 2004). 
 
Most other investment climate reforms have little or no immediate and direct impact on a 
clearly identifiable group of losers who feel sufficiently threatened or are sufficiently 
organized to object. In some product market reforms (such as opening sectors to 
competition, reforming business registration, and reducing red tape) those who stand to 
lose are firms exposed to the normal risks of doing business, individuals or bureaucratic 
groups engaged in corruption, or local politicians wanting to retain local authority 24 
functions. While these groups may resist reform, they pose a smaller political challenge 
and so usually are not directly compensated. Moreover, uncertainties about who will lose, 
who will gain, and by how much together make direct compensation difficult.  
 
Many investment climate reforms therefore involve indirect forms of compensation, often 
through political or economic concessions in the design of the reform or through policies 
to offset its effect. Unions in Poland became more inclined to support the 2002 labor 
reforms when they could make a “deal” protecting their position against the rise of new 
unions: measures aimed at promoting labor market flexibility were accompanied by 
restrictions on dismissals for members of the three main trade unions. Also important: the 
costs of reform were not concentrated in any one group, and policymakers were able to 
convince the public that short-term benefits for employers would translate into better jobs 
for all. Similarly, in Colombia, combining the 2002 labor market reforms with a broad 
package of social protection measures (including pension and health programs) made it 
possible to reduce hiring and firing restrictions while meeting union concerns about the 
lack of social safety nets. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Once policymakers have identified the priorities for reform, gotten reform onto the policy 
agenda, developed credible and feasible proposals, and built coalitions to support the 
reform, they need to move on to the next stage: implementing the reform and sustaining it 
over time. That raises an entirely new set of challenges. 25 
III.   IMPLEMENTING AND SUSTAINING REFORM 
Implementing and sustaining investment climate reforms is a critical part of the reform 
cycle. Yet this stage is often neglected. And it is at this stage that reform most commonly 
fails, for three main reasons. First, reforms tend to become overly personalized. Policy 
initiatives that depend heavily on a few key individuals often collapse once these 
individuals move on or are replaced. Second, investment climate reforms typically cut 
across different agencies and levels of government and, as a result, lack oversight and 
coordination. Third, the lower-level organizations and officials responsible for 
implementing reforms tend to have interests and objectives that differ from those of the 
policymakers who designed the reforms. Local governments and civil servants often 
revert to old practices once the political pressure for change has subsided. And they often 
have only weak capacity to carry out reform.  
 
How can these institutional challenges be addressed? Key among the measures:  
 
  Strengthening the incentives and capacity of the national and local officials and 
agencies responsible for implementing new regulations. 
 
  Creating institutional mechanisms to provide oversight and sustain reform.  
 
  Paying close attention to measuring and monitoring results, among the most 
important but weakest aspect of the reform process in all of our cases.   
 
STRENGTHENING INCENTIVES AND CAPACITY 
 
Reforms typically confront technical and administrative constraints at all levels of 
government, but especially at state and local levels, which carry the burden of 
implementation. This is also the stage where bureaucratic power typically exerts itself. 
These constraints are symptomatic of a need for broader public reform, even in relatively 
well-developed countries. Indeed, many of our cases highlight the interdependence of 
investment climate and public management reforms. Yet they also point to ways to 
overcome incentive and capacity constraints short of waiting for fundamental, long-term 
public sector reform.  
 
Bringing in new leadership and reform teams 
 
Implementing reform may require new leadership, as existing managers often find it 
difficult to reinvent themselves, are defensive about proposed changes, or suffer from a 
lack of credibility with stakeholders. Replacing obstructive officials in positions of 
influence with more reform-minded individuals helped smooth the way for regulatory 
reform in Hungary and the Slovak Republic. Bringing in new leadership and expertise 
from the private sector also proved to be a critical first step in reforming business 
registration and capital markets in Pakistan, and contributed to the success of customs 
reform in South Africa.  26 
Developing small reform teams with staff recruited on a meritocratic basis is another way 
to bring in the expertise needed to implement reform. Including the core group of 
technocrats who helped design the reforms in the first place also helps ensure a sense of 
ownership and continuity, and can enable the process to persist despite changes in the 
political landscape. In Colombia the core team involved in formulating the 2002 labor 
market reforms later joined the ministry charged with implementing them. In 
Mozambique and Peru the small technical teams that designed land reforms continued to 
facilitate dialogue and implementation. And in Latvia the involvement of the core group 
of technocrats at the Latvian Development Agency and Bureau of Public Administration 




Creating the right incentives and capacity in several cases required transforming the 
implementing agencies into new, more service-oriented ones. Pakistan converted the 
government body responsible for business registration into the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan, a higher-powered, semiautonomous agency backed by a 
legislative act (box 4). South Africa combined the Customs and Excise and Inland 
Revenue Departments to form the South Africa Revenue Service. As a semiautonomous 
agency, the new entity has the authority to set its own human resource policies, establish 
competitive pay packages, acquire and dispose of property, and impose fees or charges 
for its services (FIAS 2005j, p. 9). In both cases fresh resources from outside helped 
bolster the commitment and quality of the existing staff.  
 
In a few cases governments created new implementing agencies to bypass existing 
agencies that were considered difficult to change. In Peru, where corruption and 
resistance from bureaucrats and notaries prevented reform of the national land registry in 
the early 1990s, the government created a new, parallel agency (Cofopri) in 1996 to 
register informal property and develop the national formalization program. The goal was 
to shift responsibility for property registration from the municipalities, which had been 
resisting reform, to a central jurisdiction with decision-making power (Endo 2004, pp. 
11–13). Cofopri became an executive branch semi-autonomous agency chaired by a 
minister of state, reporting directly to the president.  27 
 
 
Box 4. Transforming organizational culture to support reform in Pakistan 
 
Created by law in 1998 to implement the Companies Ordinance, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has been markedly successful—largely thanks to a radical 
overhaul of organizational culture. In a difficult and unprecedented step, it dismissed (with paid 
salaries) 80 of the 380 staff it inherited from the old Corporate Law Authority (CLA). That 
provoked fierce resistance and legal challenges, but most of the 80 have since found other civil 
service posts. The 300 remaining employees were given a choice: continue as civil servants with 
their job security assured regardless of performance, or become employees of the SECP. 
Becoming an employee would approximately double their pay and benefits, but it would also 
expose them to the risk of being made redundant if not deemed up to the job—and force them to 
compete for promotions purely on merit. All but one accepted the new terms of employment. The 
SECP supplemented these staff with 40 international and domestic experts, a group that brought 
along outside standards of service and integrity and became the driving force behind the cultural 
change. Unlike the CLA, where cases tended to be referred up a bureaucratic structure, the SECP 
encouraged employees to take responsibility for making decisions. It emphasized staff training, 
both in Pakistan and at regulatory bodies in other countries. And it set up a vigilance cell in the 
chairman’s office to deal with complaints, within a year practically stamping out the staff 
corruption that had been entrenched in the CLA. Another critical step was the creation of a 
supervisory policy board to serve as a conduit between the government and the SECP. This 
proved crucial in overcoming the government’s resistance to relinquishing the powers it had 
exercised through the CLA. 
 
Source: Khan 2004. 
 
 
Creating performance targets and incentives 
 
Aligning managerial incentives with reform objectives is important. One way to achieve 
this is by translating these objectives into specific performance targets or indicators 
which can then be independently monitored (monitoring aspects are discussed in greater 
detail in the section below). Examples include output measures (e.g. the number of land 
titles secured), input efficiency ratios (e.g. the number of companies registered per staff 
in the business registry), softer process measures (e.g. the incidence of employee and 
investor complaints), and outcome measures (e.g. a reduction in the incidence of 
workplace fires). In Korea, for example, President Kim Dae Jung’s call for a 50 percent 
reduction in government red tape proved a useful goal for implementing regulatory 
reforms.
15 Similar targets were set in Australia, Hungary and the Netherlands, while EU 
accession requirements provided a clear set of targets for prospective member states in 
the Central and Eastern European cases.   
 
Performance incentives help attract and retain skills, and foster compliance. Peru’s new 
land management agency introduced productivity-based promotions to provide incentives 
for staff, while South Africa’s new Revenue Service established competitive pay scales 
                                                 
15 FIAS case study of Korea, forthcoming, p. 24 28 
and performance bonuses that helped attract qualified and motivated customs officers 
(FIAS 2005j, p. 9). But these examples are among the few exceptions. More often, 
established civil service procedures made it difficult to implement performance 
incentives. In Mexico sanctions for poor performers were developed but never used. In 
the Philippines civil service constraints made it impossible for the customs reform to 
address organizational and human resource issues, and as a result reforms were 
consistently undermined by customs personnel and other special interest groups (FIAS 
2005a, p. 1). When modifying civil service rules is difficult, other mechanisms can be 
considered. Hangzhou municipality in China used public recognition of managers as a 
motivating tool. It also tried to attract younger and better-educated employees and create 
a service culture that placed a higher value on experts and technical staff (Yufei, Lei, and 
Yu 2004). 
 
Training can help improve performance incentives, by raising skills and increasing job 
satisfaction. In Latvia training for inspectorates was an integral part of the reform, with 
trained inspectors given a business advisory role in addition to their traditional roles. In 
South Africa, Cape Town’s property tax reform program involved a major push to train 
data collectors and mass appraisal modelers, which helped create a conducive work 
environment and team commitment to the project’s success (FIAS 2005h, p. 5). Yet 
training is often not provided or not pursued seriously enough. In Hungary and Korea 
insufficient training at provincial and local levels led to slower implementation than 
planned (FIAS 2005f, p. 25).  
 
Contracting out reforms to the private sector 
 
When it comes to implementing certain reforms, the private sector often has greater 
expertise and capability than the public sector. The Jordanian and Mexican governments 
both took advantage of private sector strengths—the Jordanian government by 
contracting out port and airport management and the Mexican government by contracting 
out environmental auditing as part of its inspections reform. In both cases the initial 
results are promising. The challenge in these cases was to align the short-term incentives 
of private contractors with the longer-term objectives of the government institution 
responsible for implementation, and to build up the government’s capacity to oversee and 
support private contractors.  
 
Harnessing information technology 
 
Information technology is transforming the dynamics of the implementation process and 
can be a potent tool for sustaining change. Pakistan automated and electronically linked 
all its major business registries. Vietnam introduced business registration by Internet. 
And Mexico introduced electronic systems to help simplify environmental and customs 
inspections. All these information technology solutions helped simplify procedures, 
provide access to information (such as on laws, regulations, and procedures), and inform 
the public about its rights and about how to participate in the process. They also helped 
remove discretionary powers, improve transparency and accountability, and facilitate 
monitoring. Moreover, information technology solutions can be easy to replicate and 29 
scale up; in Jordan the customs system initially developed for Aqaba is now being used 
throughout the country. The effectiveness of these solutions depended in large part on 
simplifying the underlying processes and integrating them into broader change 
management efforts. 
 
CREATING OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS TO SUSTAIN REFORM 
 
Many investment climate reforms are ongoing and cross-cutting, involving many 
different departments and levels of government. Sustaining reforms can therefore demand 
special efforts to make the reforms permanent, insulate the process from political and 
bureaucratic interference, and ensure transparency and accountability. That can entail a 
new set of functions, including providing continuous oversight and advocacy, fostering 
policy coordination and compliance, supplying technical support to local levels, and 
monitoring results. 
 
The need for such new functions led to the creation of oversight mechanisms in 60 
percent of our cases, largely in cross-cutting regulatory and inspections reforms and in 
infrastructure reforms (to regulate sectoral policies and tariffs). Among the oversight 
mechanisms put into place to guide and sustain reform, the most common were 
independent commissions, followed by inter-ministerial coordinating committees and by 


























Table 1. Oversight mechanisms for reform 
 




Area of reform and 
country 













Product market         
Australia    3    3   
Hungary    3     3 
Italy  3      3 
Korea, Rep. of    3     3 
Mexico    3     3  
Pakistan    3    3   
United Kingdom  3      3  
Vietnam     3    3 
Inspections        
Latvia     3    3  
Netherlands    3     3 
Land        
Peru    3    3   
Russian Federation 
(Veliky Novgorod) 
   3    3 
Infrastructure         
Colombia (ports)    3    3   
India (Mumbai 
ports) 
  3     3 
Uganda (telecoms)    3    3   
 
Oversight mechanisms vary by type of reform in their detailed structure and mandate, but 
they tend to have common features aimed at ensuring independence from traditional 
insiders (such as political groups or business lobbies) and maintaining accountability. 
Key among these features:  
 
  Credible mandates and objectives, often made explicit by legislation to signal 
government commitment, limit the scope for deviations or reversals by line 
agencies, and define the broad principles and guidelines surrounding the policy 
change. Reforming countries passed new “enabling” or umbrella laws that were 
difficult to argue against and not specific enough to provoke opposition from 
interest groups. In Korea the passage of a new Basic Administrative Law in 1996 
made it difficult for line ministries to resist reform. Most OECD countries have 
adopted similar laws to support specialized, independent units involved in 
reforming business regulations. 
 
  Participation of a wide range of stakeholders, including high-level representatives 
from the government and, importantly, from the private sector and other groups. 
Stakeholders are brought in to contribute knowledge, experience, and ideas and to 31 
ensure transparency, minimize the risk of capture, and pressure reluctant line 
agencies to reform. The United Kingdom’s Better Regulation Task Force drew its 
members from a range of backgrounds—including business, labor unions, and 
consumer groups—all appointed by the prime minister and charged with advising 
the government on the consistency of and compliance with new legislation (FIAS 
2005d). Similarly, Mexico’s Deregulation Council, created in 1995, brought 
together representatives from the government, the private sector, labor, academia, 
and other interest groups, such as agricultural organizations. 
 
  Development of transparency and accountability mechanisms, including full 
public disclosure of the regulatory process through the Internet. In most cases 
reformers publicly disseminated draft proposals and regulatory impact 
assessments to allow feedback from consumers and expose reluctant agencies—
often a sharp break from past practices of showing drafts only to selected interest 
groups. Such practices were designed to ensure that reform did not benefit 
favored groups over others. The oversight institutions themselves were held 
accountable by the participation of a wide range of stakeholders in their governing 
councils. 
 
  A need for greater integration with finance and planning authorities. Several 
cases showed the need for greater involvement of finance and planning authorities 
to help integrate reform into line ministries and provide incentives for 
compliance. In Korea a reform team was set up in the office of the prime minister 
to support the Regulatory Reform Commission, but without budgetary threats the 
group had little leverage over reluctant line ministries (FIAS 2005f, p. 21). 
Similarly, in Mexico Cofemer’s location in the secretariat of economy rather than 
finance made it harder for the commission to exert its powers because of the 
secretariat’s narrow scope and its inability to provide consistent oversight and to 
assess the budgetary impact of proposed measures (Salas and Kikeri 2005, p. 4). 
 
Obtaining political backing and building broader ownership proved to be just as critical 
in implementing reform as in initiating it. Oversight agencies need political backing to do 
battle with the many vested interest groups opposing change, exercise leverage over 
reluctant line ministries and local governments, and ensure compliance. But sustaining 
political interest proved to be a challenge, especially under changing political 
circumstances. In Mexico presidential support was critical to the ability of the first 
deregulation agency (UDE) to remove price controls, repeal entry barriers, and simplify 
cumbersome commercial court procedures. But elections in 2000 fragmented Congress 
and weakened the president, making it harder for the new commission (Cofemer) to use 
its powers with line ministries, despite its new legal backing. In 2003, for example, 
Cofemer waived its right to issue an opinion on regulatory proposals for the 
underperforming telecommunications sector (Salas and Kikeri 2005, p. 4). A large part of 
the problem also stemmed from the fact that policymakers had worked only with the most 
senior public administration officials, leaving most of the bureaucracy feeling alienated 
from the reform effort.  Korea’s regulatory reforms similarly suffered as political support 32 
deteriorated, allowing different government departments to pull in different directions 




Measuring and monitoring results, though an essential part of the reform process, is often 
overlooked or not systematically followed up. This function involves several tasks: 
evaluating the potential costs and benefits of the reform, translating reform objectives 
into specific performance targets or indicators (as discussed above) that can then be 
monitored, and reviewing compliance and outcomes once implementation begins.  
 
In only a few cases was monitoring effective. Australia was the most positive example. 
The Australian program included monitoring agreements from the start, setting out 
quantitative targets and requiring state governments to submit annual reports to the 
National Competition Commission detailing progress made and difficulties encountered. 
Latvia introduced “report card”-type surveys to monitor inspections reform (box 5). 
Measuring initial conditions made it possible to later benchmark the progress of reform 































Box 5. Monitoring and evaluation helping to build trust in Latvia 
 
In 1999, early in the process of EU accession, the new government of Latvia identified removing 
administrative barriers to investment as a priority for reform. It made inspections reform a critical 
part of this, prompted by complaints from business about burdensome, arbitrary, and harassing 
behavior by government inspectors. The government issued a new “instruction” aimed at 
improving transparency and accountability in all inspectorates, created an Inspections 
Coordination Council, and initiated training in a new “client orientation” for inspectors.  
 
In 2001 the government was eager to evaluate its reform program. Earlier, progress had been 
assessed through focus groups and anecdotal evidence. Now the government wanted a stronger 
statistical basis to monitor progress and to determine which reforms were working as intended 
and which were off-track and in need of a new strategy. Supported by the Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service (FIAS), it carried out a self-assessment of progress. The evaluation used 
templates to gather official information about administrative procedures, a business survey to 
collect information about experiences with such procedures, and public-private dialogue to 
discuss the implications of the data and to use the data to guide revisions to the program.  
 
The 2001 survey confirmed that inspections were no longer a serious problem for businesses. It 
also made it possible to establish a baseline, using hard data about the frequency and duration of 
inspections, the incidence of bribery, and the perceived quality of each inspectorate. To take the 
gains further, the government used the data from the templates to fine-tune the reform strategy.  
 
A second survey, in 2003, documented a solid reduction in the inspections burden. The frequency 
and duration of inspections had declined, and the perceived quality of most inspections had 
improved. Interestingly, the survey results showed a significant difference between national-level 
inspectorates (fire, worker safety, sanitary), which had participated in the reform program with 
clear signs of improvement, and municipal-level inspectorates (construction, municipal police), 
which had not participated and showed no improvement.  
 
In 2005 the government requested FIAS support for a third survey, including assistance to make 
the effort fully local. Local survey firms had been used since the beginning, but there was concern 
that a government-sponsored survey would not be credible with the business community. A task 
force was organized to oversee the survey, with representatives from business, academia, civil 
society, and the government. FIAS provided basic training in sample design, quality control, and 
safeguards to protect the anonymity of respondents. While the data from the 2005 survey have not 
yet been fully analyzed, the participants, including key stakeholders from both the public and the 
private sector, are pleased to have a mechanism that both sides can trust to monitor the impact of 
ongoing reforms. 
 
Source: FIAS 2006. 
 
Elsewhere systematic monitoring was absent, was poorly enforced, or ultimately bore 
little relation to the objectives of the reform. Even the United Kingdom had little 
systematic evaluation of outcomes. Instead, monitoring was largely left to outsiders such 
as the OECD and to academics (FIAS 2005d, p. 22). In Hungary the scope and breadth of 
reforms combined with a lack of administrative and analytical capacity undermined 
evaluation. And strong opposition from ministries made the process even more difficult 34 
(FIAS 2005e, p. 32). In Korea the problem was more a lack of coherence between targets 
and desired outcomes. When the regulatory agency was required to cut the number of 
regulations by 50 percent, it responded largely by focusing on less important and 
controversial ones.  
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IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
Our analysis of the literature and case studies on reforming the investment climate leads 
us to conclude with a summary of key lessons and issues that deserve greater analytical 




There is no standard process for reform. There is and can be no “how to” manual. 
Different reforms involve different stakeholders and different mixes of technical, 
political, and institutional issues. Reform is also shaped by a country’s politics and 
capacity. The best we can do is to highlight common insights and lessons which emerge:   
 
1.  A growing set of diagnostic tools and proven good practices is making it easier to 
identify priorities for reform.  Benchmarking indicators, country rankings, business 
surveys, and industry-specific analyses are now available to help reformers more easily 
identify and target the key constraints in their country’s investment climate and therefore 
the priorities for reform. And as the case of China shows, reformers can also determine 
priorities through policy experimentation and learning from their own experiences and 
the successes of other countries.  
 
2.  Exposing the economy to international competition through trade and product 
market reforms is a good place to start. Exports and competition not only are among the 
most important drivers of growth; they also help create domestic pressures for tackling 
the other important investment climate reforms—in land, labor, and capital markets. By 
increasing competition, trade liberalization in Mexico compelled business associations to 
lobby the government for reforms aimed at reducing regulatory red tape. In Colombia the 
greater competitiveness resulting from global integration led employers to become vocal 
supporters of labor market reforms. In Central and Eastern Europe reformers deliberately 
used the process of accession to the European Union (EU) to push through regulatory 
reform, building support for the reform by linking it to the broader goal of joining the 
EU. That an economy’s openness is significantly associated with institutional change is 
among the main findings of the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook, 
September 2005 (IMF 2005). Conversely, the regions that have done the least on the 
investment climate front (such as South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa) also 
tend to be those with the highest barriers to trade and foreign direct investment.  
 
3.  New information plays a powerful role in exposing a policy problem, fostering 
competition between jurisdictions, and creating demand for change. Generating new and 
specific information about a policy problem can be an especially important catalyst for 
contentious reforms involving multiple stakeholders. In land market reforms in China 
(Shenzhen), Mozambique, Peru, the Russian Federation (Veliky Novgorod), and South 
Africa (Cape Town), reformers used detailed diagnostic studies to identify problems of 
access to land and, for the first time, to measure the costs and benefits of tackling it 
through reform. These studies helped foster debate and overcome interest group 36 
opposition. In Vietnam detailed studies exposing the costs of corruption helped develop 
support to confront the many vested interests opposing reform of the old Company Law. 
Benchmarking and rankings provide another powerful impetus. The World Bank Group’s 
recent publication of the Doing Business country rankings (World Bank 2005a), for 
instance, prompted calls for reform in more than 20 countries. In such countries as India 
and Mexico, sub-national benchmarking is playing a vital role in fostering reform due to 
increased competition between states.    
 
4.  Crisis and political change provide opportunities to push through bold reforms. A 
deep fiscal crisis together with a newly elected government generated the support 
reformers in the Slovak Republic needed to adopt and carry out tax, labor, and other 
regulatory reforms far more ambitious than the piecemeal efforts of the past. Financial 
crisis helped thrust more ambitious regulatory reforms onto the agenda in Hungary in the 
mid-1990s. Other types of crises also helped propel reform: in Mozambique the 
resettlement crisis made radical overhaul of the land code possible; in Italy and the 
Republic of Korea major corruption scandals helped launch regulatory reforms; and in 
the Netherlands two major safety accidents pushed inspections reform onto the agenda. 
Strong political support for dealing with these crises made it easier to overcome 
resistance and gain wide acceptance for reform.   
 
5.  Pilots and other pragmatic steps can provide important learning and 
demonstration effects which help get the reform process going, especially when a reform 
faces great uncertainty or strong opposition. Reform often comes about from a process of 
policy learning and experimentation. Pilots, in particular, can help create momentum and 
provide a testing ground for deeper change down the line. Peru and South Africa used 
pilots to test the technology involved in property registration and valuation, assess the 
difficulties larger-scale programs would face, and convince politicians that such 
programs were administratively and politically feasible. China has put pilots at the center 
of its reform strategy, using special economic zones to test market-oriented policies such 
as land use rights before extending them nationwide.  
 
6.  Leveraging and empowering supporters through education and dialogue can help 
mitigate interest group opposition. Supporters and potential supporters are often taken for 
granted, but educating and mobilizing them early on helps create coalitions for change 
and minimize the incentives and ability of narrow interest groups or politicians to 
obstruct the reform process. Greater discussion may be needed for reforms that will have 
wide distributional consequences and are likely to involve multiple stakeholder groups. 
These strategies appeared to be important in both democratic and non-democratic 
settings: the shift to market-oriented policies in China and Vietnam involved greater 
discussion and attention to public opinion than is commonly perceived. Yet consultation 
may have its limits even in democratic settings, especially when reform is resisted by 
narrow interest groups. Under pressure to change, policymakers pursuing port reform in 
Colombia and customs reform in Mexico opted for rapid, top-down change, made 
possible by rampant corruption and inefficiency, broad public support, and a brief 
political window of opportunity for reform.    
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7.  Incentives and capacity for implementation can be created short of fundamental 
public sector reform. Technical and administrative constraints—particularly at state and 
local levels which carry the burden of implementation—highlight the interdependence of 
investment climate and public management reforms. Yet they can be overcome without 
undertaking long-term public sector reform, by leveraging change management 
techniques from the private sector. To support business registration and capital market 
reforms, Pakistan transformed an existing government body into a new, high-powered 
commission, driven largely by leadership and skills brought in from the outside. The new 
team helped introduce flexible financial and administrative procedures, foster a service 
culture, and train staff in all the regional offices. Others contracted out implementation 
directly to the private sector—Jordan the management of ports and airports and Mexico 
its environmental auditing. Information technology solutions also were instrumental. In 
customs, business, inspections, and land registration reform, such solutions helped in 
simplifying procedures and alleviating capacity constraints, but also in removing undue 
discretionary powers, minimizing corruption, and forcing transparency.  
 
8.   Investment climate reforms, more cross-cutting and continuous than one-off 
events, call for special efforts to make the reforms permanent, insulate the process from 
political and bureaucratic interference, and ensure transparency and accountability. 
That can mean a need for new functions—providing oversight and advocacy, fostering 
policy coordination and compliance, and supplying technical support to local levels. This 
need led to the creation of new oversight mechanisms—often in the form of dedicated 
and empowered teams or institutions—in more than 60 percent of our cases. Regulatory 
reforms in Hungary, Korea, and Mexico for instance adapted the oversight mechanisms 
established in most OECD countries, supported by new umbrella laws specifying the 
standards and processes for reviewing the stock and flow of regulations.  
  
9.  Monitoring should be an integral part of the reform process, not an afterthought. 
Monitoring was effective in only a few cases, even among more developed countries. 
Among the few positive examples were Australia and Latvia, which built in clear 
performance targets and monitoring agreements at the start. Elsewhere monitoring was 
poorly enforced, or bore little relation to the underlying objectives of the reform. 
Monitoring fell short even in higher-capacity countries such as Korea and Hungary, 
where lack of analytical capabilities and opposition from ministries made the process 
difficult. In low-capacity countries monitoring proved to be even more difficult, and 
harder than initiating reform. Yet monitoring is critical—not just to evaluate impacts and 
outcomes, but also to ensure transparency, provide a feedback loop to adjust course as 
needed, allow citizens to hold reformers accountable for results, and build support for 
sustaining reform.  
 
10.  Above all, getting the reform process right is just as important as ensuring the 
sound technical content of the reform. Paying attention to the way in which reforms are 
initiated and carried out builds the legitimacy, support and ownership needed to achieve 
policies and outcomes that are both desirable and sustainable. As the economist Joseph 
Stiglitz has noted, reform process and in particular “implementation and political 38 
sustainability are not sideshows, but the main event in a reform agenda” (Stiglitz 2000, p. 
556). 
These lessons begin to add up to an emerging checklist for reformers:  
 
1.  Use the wide and growing array of new tools to benchmark and diagnose 
constraints and identify the reform priorities that will deliver. 
 
2.  Foster competition through trade and product market reforms to create pressure 
for other investment climate reforms.  
 
3.  Generate and leverage new information on specific policy reforms and proven 
good practices to expose the costs of the status quo, build support, and overcome 
opposition. 
 
4.  Seize crisis or political change to push through bold reforms. 
 
5.  Use pilots and sector-specific interventions as learning and demonstration tools 
when reforms face great uncertainty or strong opposition.  
 
6.  Leverage and empower supporters to help mitigate opposition using a mix of 
strategies and techniques, while maintaining dialogue with the private sector and 
other key stakeholder groups.  
 
7.  Do not wait for long-term public sector reform to create the right incentives and 
capacity for implementation. Bring in new leadership and skills from the outside, 
set performance targets and incentives, leverage new information technology 
solutions, and outsource implementation to the private sector. 
 
8.  Build on dedicated, empowered, and competent teams to lead and sustain the 
reform process while ensuring transparency and accountability.  
 
9.  Monitor progress closely against realistic and agreed targets and set up systems 
early in the process to measure results on the ground. 
 
10. Pay as much attention to getting the reform process right as to the technical 
content of reform to achieve desirable and sustainable policies and outcomes. 
 
FUTURE WORK  
 
The investment climate reform process remains understudied, and several areas could 
benefit from more in-depth analysis.  
 
A first is to understand better how reform processes vary across different reforms and 
country conditions with the goal of generating context-specific lessons and insights. 
While a substantial academic and practical literature is available on trade reforms, not 39 
much is known, with the partial exception of labor and land market reforms, about the 
politics and institutional aspects of specific reform areas such as business registration, 
licensing, investor protection, contract enforcement, and bankruptcy.  More case studies 
of how reforms play out under different political and institutional country conditions 
could also be useful in answering questions such as: How do reform processes differ 
between democratic and authoritarian regimes—and between presidential and 
parliamentary systems? What is the tradeoff between speed of decision-making and the 
credibility and sustainability of reform? And how do countries with weak 
governance/low capacity go about reform compared to countries with more accountable 
governments and better institutional capacity?  
 
Second, deeper analysis of complementarities across reform areas could be helpful in 
thinking about how to package and sequence reforms, particularly in countries with least 
capacity or in post-conflict. Which reforms can be bundled and which should not be—
and which reforms are unlikely to produce results unless supported by action in other 
areas? More important, given limited capacity, what measures are needed to provide clear 
signals of policy credibility or policy certainty?  
 
Third, much remains to be learned about building constituencies for change. More in-
depth analyses of how persuasion and bargaining strategies work in practice to influence 
and change stakeholders’ preferences over time could be useful, for instance through 
more analysis of: public information campaigns; side payments or outright buyouts; 
grandfather clauses and phase-ins and phase-outs of policy that spread the pain over time; 
and the  involvement of private business associations, policy think tanks, academia, and 
watch dog and other civil society organizations in launching and sustaining reform.  The 
role of the media and of a free press in making the public an active participant and 
pressure group for reform is another important area for more analysis.  Future work along 
these lines would help in moving from a static to a more dynamic understanding of 
building and supporting agents of change.  
 
A fourth issue pertains to institutional arrangements for reform. Investment climate 
reforms often require an organizational overhaul of the existing bureaucracy or the 
creation of new oversight or advocacy mechanisms to lead and sustain reform. But more 
detailed analyses, especially of experiences in low-income, low-capacity countries, are 
needed to ensure that proper arrangements are in place. In particular, more work is 
needed to shed light on such questions as these: How can incentives and capacity for 
implementation be strengthened? Are new institutional arrangements needed? If so, what 
types and under what circumstances? How do such institutions build ownership of 
reforms at the local level? What tools and approaches can and should they use to ensure 
transparency and accountability—and what are the main factors in ensuring their 
effectiveness?  
 
Fifth, monitoring, often the most neglected part of the reform process, is an area that 
most invites in-depth work. Much of the problem stems from the lack of clearly defined 
performance indicators and monitoring and evaluation systems. Thus more work is 
needed to develop reform-specific performance indicators and assess what it takes to put 40 
into place effective monitoring and evaluation systems and capabilities. All this is central 
to evaluating impacts and outcomes, ensuring transparency and accountability, and 
providing a feedback loop to adjust course as needed.  
 
The role of development partners, not explicitly addressed in this paper, is a final issue 
that deserves more emphasis. In particular, what role can donors and international 
financial institutions play? Can reformers involve the private sector and civil society 
organizations (grassroots organizations, advocacy groups, service providers) in the 
delivery of investment climate services, building on the experiences and models from 
public service sectors such as health? Would regional or sectoral networks of 
practitioners help in information sharing and capacity building, and what lessons can be 
drawn from other reforms such as private participation in infrastructure where such 
networks have played a supportive role?   41 
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Mexico   z  z  z  {  { 
Pakistan   {  {  {  z  z 
Slovak Republic   z  z  z  {  } 
United Kingdom  {  {  z  {  { 
Vietnam   z  }  }  }  } 
Inspections        { 
Latvia   z  {  z  z  } 
Mexico   {  {  z  }  { 
Netherlands   {  z  }  {  { 
Land        { 
China (Shenzen)  z  {  {  z  { 
Mozambique  }  z  {  z  { 
Peru   }  {  {  z  { 
Russian Federation 
(Veliky Novgorod) 
{  }  {  }  z 
South Africa (Cape Town)   {  {  {  z  { 
Labor         
Colombia  z  z  {  z  } 
Poland   z  z  z  {  } 
Slovak Republic  z  z  z  {  } 
Infrastructure         
Colombia (ports)  z  {  {  {  { 
India (Mumbai ports)  z  {  {  }  { 
Uganda (telecoms)  {  {  {  }  { 
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